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Abstract 
Human cognitive and analytical capabilities are needed and are indispensable to success in cyber defense. However, the high 
volume of network data challenges the process of detecting cyber-attacks, especially zero-day attacks. Training along with 
detailed and timely outcome feedback is a major factor in improving performance. It supports attributes identification and rule 
formation, which are crucial to the detection of attacks. To understand the role of feedback during training and how it influences 
the detection of novel attacks, we developed a simplified Intrusion Detection System and trained 160 participants to perform as 
analysts. During training, participants classified network events representing a specific cyber-attack, and received feedback at the 
end of each trial. Detailed feedback used color schemes informing of hits, misses, false-alarms, and correct-rejections. 
Aggregated feedback provided numerical summaries regarding performance. After training, participants classified events that 
were similar or part of a novel attack. Results show that detailed feedback accelerated learning and improved detection accuracy 
compared to aggregated feedback. Participants who received aggregated feedback failed to learn the role of certain network 
attributes and how to integrate them into detection rules. Surprisingly, aggregated feedback improved detection in the novel 
attack. The novelty of a situation caused an increase in decision scrutiny, while familiar decision situations limited the depth of 
information search and evaluation. Analyst should learn to abstract information and look broadly at outcome feedback to improve 
their ability to detect novel attacks. We discuss the implications of these findings for improving cyber security. 
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1. Introduction 
Disrupting computers and the loss of sensitive information through cyber-attacks are becoming a widespread 
threat and a critical concern. Guarding against such attacks is a significant part of network governance done by cyber 
security analysts [1]. Even with recent advances in information and network security and the development of new 
monitoring and threat detection tools, the tasks performed by the analyst cannot be completely automated. The 
analytical capabilities of the human decision maker are needed and indispensable [2]. In their work, security analysts 
heavily rely on Intrusion Detection System (IDS), technologies that can detect network intrusions and network 
misuse by matching patterns of known attacks against ongoing network activity. Once the IDS finds a match to a 
known type of attack or detects abnormal network activity, it produces alerts detailing the suspicious events [3]. 
Considering the amount of traffic in a mid-size corporate network and the ever-growing number and complexity of 
cyber-attacks, the number of alerts generated can be overwhelming. Such systems can trigger thousands of alerts per 
day, up to 99% of which are false alerts [3]. Eventually, the high volume of intrusion alerts that needs to be 
processed and the high probability of false alerts make the process of accurately detecting a cyber-attack challenging 
for human cognitive capabilities. 
There is a growing body of work within the cyber security field that focuses on understanding the work processes 
of analysts [3, 4, 5]. Monitoring and detection belong to a general process called triage analysis, which 
fundamentally depend on the analyst’s knowledge [6]. Usually, analysts undergo extensive training and certification 
programs to attain such knowledge and expertise. However, despite the cardinal role of training, little is known 
about how to train analysts to detect threats in a highly dynamic cyber space. Even less is known about how to 
support the detection of zero-day attacks, which are novel attacks that take advantage of unknown vulnerabilities, or 
how analysts generalize existing knowledge to judge and make a decision regarding a novel network situation. 
Understanding how the analyst detects relevant attributes and constructs the appropriate decision rule to 
determine the network’s status is extremely important. If critical attributes are overlooked, an attack can go 
unnoticed and cause severe damage. Similarly, agile rule formation supports timely detection and can assist in the 
detection of novel threats. Proper training, along with detailed and timely outcome feedback, is a major factor in 
improving performance [7]. Such feedback can support both attributes identification and rule formation. This study 
examines how training with feedback, which does not explicitly point to relevant attributes or to actual rules, 
influences performance when confronting familiar or novel cyber-attacks. This implies that it is possible to increase 
the consideration of an attribute as relevant and its inclusion in a classification rule.  
2. Attribute identification and rule learning in cyber security 
Network traffic data is big and complex because many records are generated per second and each have many 
attributes. For example, the description of network traffic can include timestamp, protocol type, source IP, 
destination IP, port activity, and duration among others. Considering the quantity and complexity of network data, it 
is important to provide the analyst with the right information that allows fast and accurate detection. Providing 
sparse information or overwhelming amounts of information can undermine the analyst's judgments and decrease 
detection accuracy. Furthermore, a single attribute cannot usually provide sufficient indication of a network’s status. 
Thus, the analyst has to consider relatively complex rules that combine multiple attributes. Such rules accommodate 
the existence of internal relationships between the attributes and the exact internal relationship. For example, high 
network activity between two internal IP addresses is treated differently from high network activity from an internal 
IP address to an external one. In this example, three attributes (i.e., source IP, destination IP, and the amount of 
traffic between them) combine to form a rule that determines the type of a network activity. 
Such decision making involves an iterative process of identifying relevant attributes and discovering a conceptual 
rule. Attributes identification is a preliminary requirement for rule formation, where a subset of relevant attributes is 
attended to from a larger set of attributes. The number of relevant and irrelevant attributes, the number of values 
each attribute can take, the variability within these values, and redundancy or overlap between attributes can impact 
identification [8, 9]. According to a relevant set of attributes, a rule can be formed. Rules are considered the atoms 
of thought, and as such, they are of great interest to cognitive science [10]. Some rules are easy to discover and 
learn, while others are more difficult and less intuitive [11]. Recent approach to rule complexity uses Boolean 
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algebra and logical operations that combine attributes as a measure of complexity. Hence, the subjective difficulty of 
a rule is proportional to the minimal length of the Boolean formula that represents the rule [11]. 
Through repeated interaction, it is possible to learn a rule from experience and successfully apply it in a specific 
environment—this increases performance in terms of accuracy and speed. Furthermore, rules also support abstract 
reasoning and are crucial for reasoning across contexts. They allow for the transfer of abstract knowledge learned in 
one environment (i.e., training environment) to other environments (i.e., transfer environment). Rules devised in one 
environment can apply to and prove to be useful in other environments, and therefore improve performance in novel 
situations. The extent to which it is possible to transfer a rule between environments depends on the similarity 
between the environments [10, 12]. 
Similarity takes many forms and definitions. Deep similarity is described as structural consistency with one-to-
one mapping between low level elements and as consistency in the relationships between the elements. In contrast, 
surface similarity usually refers to perceptual similarity, which is a result of a high level comparison of aggregated 
attributes [12]. For example, novices rely more on surface similarity while experts tend to rely on structural 
similarity [13]. In many real world situations, however, generalization and learning can benefit from both deep and 
surface similarity as long as there is no conflict between them.  
Similarity is used in cyber security as part of alert correlation algorithms. It helps identify common attack 
patterns, which occur at different points in the network or were previously observed on different networks [14]. The 
Diamond Model of intrusion analysis [15] illustrates the importance of similarity in identifying malicious events and 
common network behaviors. The model describes how the use of similarities in infrastructure and cyber capabilities 
support attribution of attacks and how similarity can be utilized to predict future targets of an attacker. Similarity is 
also important to the detection of zero-day attacks when operating on the assumption that there is some similarity 
between the attack vector in use and previously detected attack vectors in zero-day exploits [16]. Despite the use of 
similarity in cyber security, there is limited understanding of how analysts detect similarities between previously 
observed attacks and novel attacks. Moreover, little is known about how analyst can be trained to utilize similarity 
when attending to the relevant attributes and forming an appropriate classification rule. To better understand the 
interplay between the type of feedback during training, detection of threats, and similarity, we developed a 
simplified IDS. Our hypothesis is that detailed feedback during training will have a positive effect on threat 
detection. However, training with aggregated feedback, which hints at the correct classification without surrendering 
all the details, might has positive effect on the detection of novel attacks. 
3. Simplified intrusion detection task 
In this study, participants served as security analysts of a fictitious online retail company. Their duty was to 
protect the company’s network from a malicious attacker. Based on the network described by Lye and Wing [17], 
illustrated in Figure 1, we used a simple stereotypical computer network. This network setting is commonly used in 
Fig. 1. The local computer network. 
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cyber security research and training, as well as in the operative networks of real-world mid-size corporations [6, 17, 
18]. Such networks typically consist of a web server, a file server, and a cluster of workstations. 
Detailed instructions described the network nodes and the dependencies between them (for a detailed description, 
see [6]). The security analyst (i.e., the participant) monitors this network by observing sequences of network events 
through the interface seen in Figure 2. Each sequence includes network events that represents a single independent 
network scenario. The order of the events within a scenario corresponds to the order in which they occurred over the 
network, and the participant’s goal is to decide whether or not a network event is malicious. Each network event is 
presented one by one and has an identification number corresponding to its presentation. The event can also include 
an Alert, which provides information regarding a suspicious network activity; for example, indicating that a service 
has stopped or started. The IDS can generate false alerts and can also miss malicious events. The last part of the 
display presents the event’s description. The structure of the description is consistent, and it includes the type of 
network node (e.g., web server) and the processes which are currently running on it (e.g., httpd), the traffic load 
going between that node and another node (e.g., between the web server and the fileserver). Traffic load had one of 
the following values: 0Mbps, 3.3Mbps, 6.7Mbps, and 10Mbps; where 3.3Mbps is the normal traffic condition, 
0Mbps indicates that there is no traffic between two nodes, and 10Mbps indicates maximal capacity. Additional 
information in the description indicates whether or not an operation was executed on this network node. The 
simplified information for each network event resembled the presentation of events’ signature in IDS, with 
simplifications allowing participants without experience with IDS to comprehend it. An analyst can classify each 
event as malicious or not by checking or un-checking the corresponding “Is threat” box for each event. Upon 
completing a network scenario, participants received feedback and a message informing them that a new network 
scenario is about to appear. 
4. Method 
4.1. Design and procedure 
After classifying all the events in a scenario, the experimental system provided feedback regarding the 
classification. We evaluated two types of feedback and their influence on learning and the ability to generalize the 
learning process to novel scenarios. A detailed feedback, illustrated Figure 2, used a color scheme to inform the 
participants of the hits (bright green), misses (bright red), false-alarms (orange), and correct-rejections (light green) 
they made in a trial. This information was accompanied with numeric summaries of the current and total earnings 
based upon performance. In the aggregated feedback conditions, participants received summarized numerical 
information regarding their performance in each trial. The feedback included the number of correctly classified 
Fig. 2. The IDS displaying detailed feedback after classification of network events. 
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events in the trial without separately categorizing hits, misses, false-alarms, and correct-rejections. The feedback 
also provided the current and total earnings based upon performance. Unlike the detailed condition, however, 
participants did not see which events were classified correctly.  
The experiment involved a 2×2 factorial design, with feedback type (Aggregated or Detailed) and type of transfer 
environment (Similar or Novel) as the independent variables. Hence, there were four experimental conditions, each 
with 40 participants. The experiment included two phases: training and transfer. There is a training phase that 
consisted of eight consecutive trials, during which participants classified network events in eight versions of the 
same network scenario and received detailed or aggregated feedback. When the training phase ended, participants 
were informed they would now do the transfer phase, where participants classified network events in two network 
scenarios without receiving any feedback. In the Similar conditions, participants classified events in two network 
scenarios that represented the same cyber-attack as in the training phase. While in the Novel conditions, participants 
classified events in two scenarios that represented a novel attack type not previously observed during training. 
4.2. Network scenarios 
An attacker outside the corporation may try to gain access to the corporate network to obtain confidential 
information or to compromise an essential service. For this, the attacker follows an “island-hopping” attack [2], 
where the web server is compromised first and is then used to originate attacks on the file server or on the company 
workstations. Based on the network structure illustrated in Figure 1, we defined two network scenarios; each 
represents a different type of an attack. We used the same ground truth rule for both network scenarios. An event is 
malicious if there is an alert, and if the description of the event indicates irregular network traffic or that an 
operation was executed on one of the network node (or both). Thus, a network event is malicious if it follows this 
rule: Alertģ(OperationĤNetwork Load). Each scenario was composed of 20 network events, with a base-rate of 
.35 malicious events. As the IDS can generate false alerts, it generated three false alerts in each of the scenarios. 
For training, we used a network scenario representing intrusion and data exfiltration. This scenario starts with 
normal network operation and ends after the attacker attained confidential information and disrupted the network’s 
regular operation. The attacker gains access to the web server by compromising one of the services it runs. Once the 
attacker has hacked into the web server, he installs a backdoor program that provides access to the file server. Then 
the attacker steals confidential information stored on the file server and causing even more damage to the network, 
the attacker shuts the network down using the obtained privileges. We generated a pool of eight versions of this 
scenario by applying changes to the content and order of the network events that are not related to the cyber-attack.  
The transfer scenario represented intrusion and the installation of a password sniffer. In this scenario, the attacker 
gains control over the web server and installs a password sniffer. The sniffer collects the passwords of legitimate 
users as they access the file server or web server. Later, the attacker comes back and collects the password list from 
the sniffer. If the attacker goes unnoticed, the consequences can be disastrous. The attacker may have access to 
valuable information and network resources. This sniffer is detected by the IDS before the attacker manages to 
sabotage the network services.  
4.3. Participants 
We recruited 160 participants (46% women, meanage=23.04, SDage=2.90) to a computer laboratory, each was 
randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. Participants were compensated with $10 as base 
payment and could earn additional monetary incentive based on performance. During the training phase, participants 
could earn 1 cent for each threat and non-threat correctly classified and lose 1 cent for each threat and non-threat 
incorrectly classified. During transfer, participants could earn 10 cents for each threat and non-threat correctly 
classified and lose 10 cents for each threat and non-threat incorrectly classified. 
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5. Results 
First, we analyze the performance in intrusion detection during the training and transfer periods. Then, we look 
closely at the network events themselves and evaluate how the attributes and the structure of the event influenced 
classification. As the participants’ decisions in the first training trial were not influenced by feedback, the statistical 
analysis starts from the second training trial on; for completeness though, the plots show all data, including the first 
trial. 
5.1. Training 
5.1.1. Threat detection 
Overall, we find that detailed feedback facilitated detection compared to aggregated feedback. Results shows 
higher hit rate in the Detailed condition (mean=.82, SD=.19) compared to the Aggregated condition (mean=.50, 
SD=.26), F(1,158)=146.603, p<.001. Similarly, the false-alarms rate in the Detailed condition (mean=.14, SD=.13) 
was lower than in the Aggregated condition (mean=.22, SD=.15), F(1,158)=19.550, p<.001. Combining these two 
measures of detection, using d-prime (d’), suggests that participants in the Detailed condition (d’=1.99) preformed 
the detection task better than participants in the Aggregated condition (d’=0.77). 
As seen in Figure 3a, from the second trial onwards, there is an advantage to the Detailed feedback compared to 
the Aggregated feedback, as expressed by a higher hit rate. The significant two-way interaction between the 
feedback condition and trial indicates that in the Detailed condition performance in the Detailed condition improved 
with experience, while the hit rate remained relatively stable across trials in the Aggregated condition, 
F(1,158)=24.049, p<.001. 
Analysis of the false-alarms rate also revealed a significant two-way interaction between feedback and trial, 
F(1,158)=21.648, p<.001. In the Detailed condition the false-alarms rate decreased with experience (see Figure 3b). 
In the Aggregated condition there was no decrease or increase in the false-alarms rates and thus, trial to trial learning 
did not improve participants’ performance.  
5.1.2. Attributes and rule structure 
Participants in the Detailed condition detected more threats correctly compared to participants in the Aggregated 
for the threats in the form of Alert+Load+Operation, Alert+Load, and Alert+Operation, t(158)=4.600, p<.001; 
t(158)=9.339, p<.001 and t(158)=11.478, p<.001, respectively. This finding is consistent with the overall higher 
detection rate of participants in the Detailed condition. Analysing how each type of feedback influenced the 
detection of the different types of events, we find that in the Aggregated feedback condition, threats in the form of 
Alert+Load were correctly detected less often compared to threats in the form of Alert+Load+Operation, t(158) 
=4.247, p<.001. Furthermore, threats in the form of Alert+Operation were detected less successfully compared to 
threats in the form of Alert+Load, t(158)=6.989, p<.001. In contrast, in the Detailed condition, we find no 
significant differences in the detection of threats in the form of Alert+Load+Operation compared to Alert+Load, 
t(158)=1.526, p=ns. However, the detection of threats in the form of Alert+Load was higher compare to threats in 
the form of Alert+Operation, t(158)=7.656, p<.001.  
Fig. 3. Average (a) hit and (b) false alarm rate when detecting malicious network events in a trial for the Detailed and Aggregated feedback conditions. 
a b 
1094   Noam Ben-Asher and Cleotilde Gonzalez /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  1088 – 1095 
Analysis of the false alerts rates in each of the non-threat event types reveals that the differences in the false alert 
rate between participants in Detailed and Aggregated conditions also depended on the type of attributes that 
composed the event. Misclassification of events in the form of Load Only and Load+Operation were significantly 
lower in the Detailed condition compared with the Aggregated condition, t(158)=4.899, p<.001 and t(158)=4.144, 
p<.001, respectively. However, feedback condition had no effect on the false detection of events in the form of 
Operation Only, t(158)=.862, p=ns.  
5.2. Transfer 
5.2.1. Threat detection 
During the transfer phase, participants continued to benefit from the detailed feedback they received during 
training. As seen in Figure 4a, the detection rates of participants in the Detailed condition were higher than those of 
the participants in the aggregated conditions in both similar and novel scenarios, t(158)=8.531, p<.001 and 
t(158)=4.231, p<.001, respectively. Furthermore, there were no differences in the detection rates of participants that 
were trained with Detailed feedback between the Similar (mean=.80, SD=.18) and Novel (mean=.79, SD=.18) 
scenarios, t(158)=.492, p=ns. However, for participants that received aggregated feedback during training, we find 
higher detection rates in the Novel scenarios (mean=.62, SD=.31) compared to the Similar scenarios (mean=.49, 
SD=.27), t(158)=2.829, p=.005. As seen in Figure 4b, when the scenarios were similar, false alarm rates of 
participants in the Detailed condition were significantly lower than those of participants in the Aggregated 
condition, t(158)=6.004, p<.001. For the novel scenarios, however, the differences between the feedback conditions 
were only marginal, t(158)=1.628, p=.106.  Furthermore, in the Detailed feedback condition we find an marginally 
significant increase in the false alarm rate when the transfer environment is novel, t(158)=1.675, p=.096. In contrast, 
for the Aggregated feedback condition we find a significant decrease in the false alarm rate when the transfer 
environment is novel, t(158)=3.172, p=.002.  
5.2.2. Attributes and rule structure 
Results indicated that participants in the Aggregated condition better classified the Alert+Load and 
Alert+Operation types in the novel environment (mean=.81, SD=.35 and mean=.50, SD=.34) compared to the 
similar environment (mean=.57, SD=.35 and mean=.33, SD=.34), t(78)=3.069, p=.003 and t(78)=2.199, p=.031, 
respectively. The hit rates of events in the form of Alert+Load+Operation was not influenced by the transition to 
novel or similar network scenario.  
6. Discussion and conclusions 
We investigate how feedback format during training affects the detection of novel and familiar types of attacks in 
cyber security scenarios. Through feedback and without an explicit definition of relevant attributes, we expected that 
people would learn the rules to accurately identify threats. During training, detailed feedback facilitated threat 
detection compared to aggregated feedback. Furthermore, detailed feedback helped identify the attributes that lead 
to better threat identification. Thus, detailed feedback supported the transfer of the structural knowledge, including 
a b 
Fig. 4. Hits (a) and false alarm (b) rates during the transfer phase as a function of the event type and the feedback condition. 
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rules and attributes and is essential for successful training. After training with detailed feedback, participants were 
accurate in detecting cyber-attacks in novel and familiar scenarios compared to participants trained with aggregated 
feedback. The difficulty of detecting threats in the form of Alert+Operation in the aggregated feedback conditions 
replicates the findings from Ben-Asher and Gonzalez [6], and demonstrates how detailed feedback can counteract 
the tendency to overlook a relevant attribute in the detection process. 
In contrast to a training environment that provides immediate and accurate feedback, analysts typically operate in 
an environment with limited and delayed feedback. Detection in a novel environment after training with aggregated 
feedback resembles the detection of zero-day attacks. Improvement in this type of task suggests that transfer to a 
novel environment triggered more careful evaluation of attributes and a more deliberate process of rule generation 
[18, 19]. This process depends on deep similarity, rather than on surface similarity. Developing such abilities are 
curial for successful detection of novel attacks.  
Appropriate training may support attribute identification and rule construction by directing attention to the 
attributes relevant to good performance in the task. Thus, detailed feedback may help individuals acquire knowledge 
about the task structure. However, in addition to training with detailed and timely feedback, cyber analysts should 
also learn to abstract information and look more broadly at outcome feedback to improve their ability to detect novel 
threats.  
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